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The Looting of Africa
Introduction
Unequal trade and investment relationships are nothing new for Af-
rica, although beginning in 2005 the world’s attention was drawn to 
Africa’s plight as never before. however, in contrast to the neo-or-
thodox strategy implied by Gordon brown, bono, bob Geldoff and 
other mainstream campaigners, Africa’s deepening integration into 
the world economy has typically generated not wealth but the out-
flow of wealth. There is new evidence available to demonstrate this 
conclusively, just as the current fusion of neoliberalism and neocon-
servatism consolidates. 
in fact, the deeper global power relations that keep Africa down 
(and, simultaneously, African elites shored up) should have been obvi-
ous to the world during 2005. it was a year in which numerous events 
1 A longer version of the argument under the title Looting Africa: The Economics of 
Exploitation is published by Zed books in July 2006.
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were lined up to ostensibly help liberate Africa from poverty and pow-
erlessness, to provide relief from crushing debt loads, to double aid 
and to establish a ‘development round’ of trade:
the mobilization of NGo-driven citizens campaigns like brit-
ain’s Make Poverty history and the Johannesburg-based Global 
Call to Action Against Poverty (throughout 2005);
Tony blair’s Commission for Africa (February);
The main creditor countries’ debt relief proposal (June);
a tour of Africa by the new World bank president Paul Wolfow-
itz (June);
the G8 Gleneagles debt and aid commitments (July);
the Live 8 consciouness-raising concerts (July);
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals review 
(september);
the return to Nigeria of monies looted by sani Abacha and de-
posited in swiss bank accounts (september);
the iMF/World bank annual meeting addressing debt and Third 
World ‘voice’ (september);
a large debt relief package for Nigeria (october); and
the deal done at the World Trade organization’s ministerial 
summit in hong kong (December).
These all revealed global-elite hypocrisy and power relations which 
remained impervious to advocacy, solidarity and democratization. At 
best, partial critiques of imperial power emerged amidst the cacoph-
ony of all-white rock concerts and political grandstanding. At worst, 
polite public discourse tactfully avoided capital’s blustering violence, 
from Nigeria’s oil-soaked Delta to northeastern Congo’s gold mines to 
botswana’s diamond finds to sudan’s killing fields. Most of the Lon-
don charity NGo strategies ensured that core issue areas –debt, aid, 
trade and investment– would be addressed in only the most superfi-
cial ways. The 2005 events also revealed the limits of celebrity-chasing 
tactics aimed at intra-elite persuasion rather than pressure. Tragically, 
the actual conditions faced by most people on the continent continued 
to deteriorate. 
Today, Africa is still getting progressively poorer, with per capita 
incomes in many countries below those of the 1950s-60s era of in-
dependence. if we consider even the most banal measure of poverty, 
most sub-saharan African countries suffered an increase in the per-
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centage of people with income of less than $1/day during the 1980s 
and 1990s, the World bank itself concedes2 (World bank, 2005c:66). 
Not just poverty but also inequality must be central to the analysis, 
for Africa hosts some of the world’s worst cases. The following coun-
tries exceed a 0.50 Gini coefficient score, placing them at the very 
top of the world’s ranking: Namibia, botswana, the Central African 
Republic, swaziland, Lesotho, south Africa, Zambia, Malawi, The 
Gambia and Zimbabwe.
The looting of Africa has also been intensely gendered. Women are the 
main victims of systemic poverty and inequality, whether in produc-
tive circuits of capital (increasingly subject to sweatshop conditions) 
2 For a critique of the $/day measure, see Reddy, s. (2005). 
Namibia 72 Burundi 41
Botswana 65 Nigeria 41
Central African Republic 62 Burkina Faso 40
Swaziland 61 Angola 39
Lesotho 58 Senegal 39
South Africa 57 Mozambique 39
Zambia 53 Mali 38
Malawi 51 Ghana 38
The Gambia 50 Guinea 38
Zimbabwe 50 Mauritania 37
Madagascar 46 Benin 36
Cote d’Ivoire 43 Tanzania 35
Kenya 42 Níger 33
Uganda 42 Etiopía 28
Cameroon 41 Mauritius 19
Source: World Bank (2005), World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development, Washington, p.39.
* A Gini score of 0 is perfect equality while 100 indicates that one person has all the income and all others have none. Scores 
above.50 represent quite extreme conditions. Bank staff calculated Gini coefficients from household survey data, and dates differ by 
data availability.
Table 1
African inequality (Gini coefficients by country, early 2000s)*
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or in the ‘sphere of reproduction’ of households and labour markets, 
where much primitive accumulation occurs through unequal gender 
power relations. There are many ways, Dzodzi Tsikata and Joanna 
kerr have shown, that markets and mainstream economic policy ‘per-
petuate women’s subordination’ (Tsikata and kerr, 2002).
in particular, the denial of Africans’ access to food, medicines, 
energy and even water is a common reflection of neoliberal domi-
nance in social policy, as people who are surplus to capitalism’s la-
bour power requirements find that they had better fend for themselves 
–or simply die. in even relatively prosperous south Africa, an early 
death for millions –disproportionately women– was the outcome of 
state and employer reaction to the AiDs epidemic, with cost-benefit 
analyses demonstrating to the state and capital that keeping most of 
the country’s five to six million hiV-positive people alive through pat-
ented medicines cost more than the people were ‘worth’3. 
The decimated social wage is one indicator of Africa’s amplified 
underdevelopment in recent years. in the pages that follow, however, 
we focus on the material processes of Africa’s underdevelopment via 
trade and extractive-oriented investment, largely through the deple-
tion of natural resources. This is an area of research that has already 
helped catalyse the ecological debt and reparations movement, and 
that has sufficient intellectual standing to be the basis of a recent World 
bank study, Where is the Wealth of Nations? (World bank, 2005a) (A 
similar critique could be levelled against financial processes, showing 
how the June 2005 G7 Finance Ministers’ debt relief deal perpetuates 
rather than ends debt peonage4.)
The story is not new, of course. We can never afford ourselves the 
luxury of forgetting the historical legacy of a continent looted: trade 
by force dating back centuries; slavery that uprooted around 12 
million Africans; land grabs; vicious taxation schemes; precious 
metals spirited away; the appropriation of antiquities to the brit-
ish Museum and other trophy rooms; the 19th century emergence 
of racist ideologies to justify colonialism; the 1884-85 carve-up of 
Africa into dysfunctional territories in a berlin negotiating room; 
the construction of settler-colonial and extractive-colonial systems 
3 in the case of the vast Johannesburg/London conglomerate Anglo American Cor-
poration, the cut-off for saving workers in 2001 was 12%. The lowest-paid 88% of em-
ployees were more cheaply dismissed once unable to work, with replacements found 
amongst south Africa’s 42% unemployed reserve army of labour, according to an inter-
nal study reported by the Financial Times. For more, see bond, Patrick (2005).
4 one of the strongest recent overviews of African debt is Capps, G. (2005); see also 
bond, P. (2006).
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–of which apartheid, the German occupation of Namibia, the Portu-
guese colonies and king Leopold’s belgian Congo were perhaps only 
the most blatant– often based upon tearing black migrant workers 
from rural areas (leaving women vastly increased responsibilities as 
a consequence); Cold War battlegrounds –proxies for Us/UssR con-
flicts– filled with millions of corpses; the post-Cold War terrain of 
unipolar power; other wars catalysed by mineral searches and off-
shoot violence such as witnessed in blood diamonds and other pre-
cious metals and minerals such as coltan (the cellphone ingredient 
found in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo); poacher-
stripped swathes of East, Central and southern Africa now devoid 
of rhinos and elephants whose ivory became ornamental material 
or aphrodisiac in the Middle East and East Asia; societies used as 
guinea pigs in the latest corporate pharmaceutical test; and the list 
could continue.
As is also abundantly clear, Africa also suffers a systemic cultur-
al and ideological impoverishment in the North. international mass 
media images of Africans were nearly uniformly negative during the 
recent period. it was from West Africa that the neoconservative, neo-
Malthusian writer Robert kaplan described for his frightened Us 
audience a future defined in terms of ‘disease, overpopulation, un-
provoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the in-
creasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the 
empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international 
drug cartels’ (kaplan, 1994: 46). As the ‘dark continent’, Africa has 
typically been painted with broad-brush strokes, as a place of hea-
then and uncivilized people, as savage and superstitious, as tribalis-
tic and nepotistic. David Wiley has shown how western media cov-
erage is crisis driven, based upon parachute journalism, amplified 
by an entertainment media which ‘perpetuates negative images of 
helpless primitives, happy-go-lucky buffoons, evil pagans. The me-
dia glorify colonialism/European intervention. Currently, Africa is 
represented as a place of endemic violence and brutal but ignorant 
dictators’. Add to this the ‘animalization of Africa via legion of na-
ture shows on Africa that present Africa as being devoid of humans’, 
enhanced by an ‘advertising industry that has built and exploited 
(and thereby perpetuated) simplistic stereotypes of Africa’5. Thus it 
was disgusting but logical, perhaps, that African people were set-
tled into a theme village at an Austrian zoo in June 2005, their huts 
placed next to monkey cages in scenes reminiscent of 19th century 
exhibitions. in an explanatory letter, zoo director barbara Jantschke 
5 <http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/curriculum/lm1/1/lm1_teachers.html>.
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denied that this was ‘a mistake’ because ‘i think the Augsburg zoo is 
exactly the right place to communicate an atmosphere of the exotic’ 
(hawley, 2005).
ironically, the World bank’s ecological economists have conceded 
as much in their calculations of natural resources depletion: petro-
leum, other subsoil mineral assets, timber resources, nontimber for-
est resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland. indeed, the 
bank calculates that much of Africa is poorer not wealthier the more 
its comparative advantage in resources is pursued. Where is the Wealth 
of Nations? makes several crucial adjustments to gross national in-
come and savings accounts. by subtracting fixed capital depreciation, 
adding education spending, subtracting resource depletion and sub-
tracting pollution damage, the bank finds that some countries are vast 
losers via export processing.
The picture is not entirely negative, for there has been a slight 
upturn in the terms of trade for African countries thanks to higher 
commodity prices associated with East Asian demand. but this should 
not disguise the profoundly unequal and unfair system of export-led 
growth, which has impoverished Africans in many ways. As a result, 
according to Christian Aid, ‘Trade liberalization has cost sub-saha-
ran Africa $272 billion over the past 20 years… overall, local produc-
ers are selling less than they were before trade was liberalized’6 (Aid, 
2005). Deconstructing African countries according to whether there 
was rapid or slow trade liberalization from 1987-99, Christian Aid 
found a close correlation between trade openness and worsening pov-
erty. one reason was falling commodity prices during the 1980s-90s.
Commodity export dependency
and falling terms of trade 
The most important myth of neoliberal economics is that production 
for export inexorably creates prosperity. in reality, ‘unequal exchange’ 
in trade –including the rising African trade deficit with south Africa– is 
another route for the extraction of superprofits from Africa. The conti-
nent’s share of world trade declined over the past quarter century, but 
the volume of exports increased. ‘Marginalization’ of Africa occurred, 
hence, not because of insufficient integration, but because other areas 
of the world –especially East Asia– moved to the export of manufac-
tured goods, while Africa’s industrial potential declined thanks to exces-
sive deregulation associated with structural adjustment. 
overall, primary exports of natural resources accounted for near-
ly 80% of African exports in 2000, compared to 31% for all developing 
6 see also kraev, E. (2005).
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countries and 16% for the advanced capitalist economies. According 
to the UN Conference on Trade in Development, in 2003, a dozen Af-
rican countries were dependent upon a single commodity for exports, 
including crude petroleum (Angola 92%, Congo 57%, Gabon 70%, Ni-
geria 96% and Equatorial Guinea 91%); copper (Zambia 52%); dia-
monds (botswana 91%); coffee (burundi 76%, Ethiopia 62%, Uganda 
83%), tobacco (Malawi 59%) and uranium (Niger 59%) (oxfam, 2005: 
21). Excluding south Africa, the vast majority (63%) of sub-saharan 
exports in recent years have been petroleum-related, largely from 
Nigeria, Angola and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea. The next 
largest category of exports from the subcontinent (and not including 
south Africa) is food and live animals (17%) (UN Conference on Trade 
in Development, 2003: 250). The problems associated with primary 
product export dependence are not only high levels of price volatility 
and downward price trends for many natural resources. in addition, 
especially for minerals, production is highly capital-intensive, offers 
low incentives for educational investments, and provides a greater 
danger of intervention by parasitical rentiers (Cornia, 1999). 
More than two-thirds of Africa’s trade is with developed countries, 
although beginning in 1990, China’s share rose from 2% to 9%, in the 
process attracting growing controversy over geopolitics (because from 
sudan to Zimbabwe to Angola, Chinese loans and investments propped 
up corrupt regimes) and deindustrialization. The Chinese threat to Af-
rican industry is profound, with Nigeria losing 350,000 jobs directly 
(and 1.5 million indirectly) due to Chinese competition from 2000-05. 
Lesotho’s garment industry collapsed when the Africa Growth and op-
portunity Act benefits evaporated in 2005 once China joined the WTo 
(Chiahemen, 2005). 
but the main damage remains the long-term decline in primary 
product price trends. As Michael barrett brown explains: ‘The value 
added in making up manufactured goods has been greatly increased 
compared with the raw material required; synthetics continue to re-
place natural products in textiles, shoes and rubber goods; and the 
elasticity of demand for agricultural products (the proportion of extra 
incomes spent on food and beverages) has been steadily falling’. Not-
withstanding the 2002-05 price increases –especially oil, rubber and 
copper thanks to Chinese import demand– the value of coffee, tea and 
cotton exports many African countries rely upon continues to stagnate 
or fall. Falling prices for most cash crops pushed Africa’s agricultural 
export value down from $15 billion in 1987 to $13 billion in 2000 not-
withstanding greater volumes of exports7 (barratt-brown, 2004).
7 see also barratt-brown, M. and Tiffen, P. (1992).
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in historical terms, the prices of primary commodities (other than fu-
els) have risen and fallen according to a deeper rhythm. Exporters of 
primary commodities, for example, fared particularly badly when fin-
anciers were most powerful. The cycle for an exporting country typi-
cally begins with falling commodity prices, then leads to rising foreign 
debt, dramatic increases in interest rates, a desperate intensification 
of exports which lowers prices yet further, and bankruptcy. Using 1970 
as a base index year of 100, from 1900 to 1915, the prices of commodi-
ties rose from 130 to 190, and then fell dramatically to 90 in 1919. 
From a low point of 85 in 1930, as the Great Depression began, the 
commodity price index rose mainly during World War ii to 135, as de-
mand for raw materials proved strong and shipping problems created 
supply-side problems. Prices fell during the subsequent globalization 
process until 1968 (to 95 on the index), but soared to 142 at the peak 
of a commodity boom in 1973 when oil and minerals –especially gold– 
temporarily soared. The subsequent fall in commodity prices took the 
index down steadily, well below 40 by the late 1990s (Leon and soto, 
1997: 350). in Ethiopia, to illustrate, coffee exports rose from 1992, 
with the volume of output doubling by 2003. but the export value fell 
from $450 million to less than $100 million during the same period 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2005:141). 
Commodity prices were extremely volatile in key sectors affecting 
Africa. Gold rose from $35/ounce in 1971 to $850/ounce in 1981 but 
then crashed to as low as $250 by the late 1990s. The 2002-05 minor 
Product, Unit 1980 1990 2001
Cafe (Robusta) cents/kg 411.70 118.20 63.30
Cocoa cents/kg 330.50 126.70 111.40
Groundnut oil dollars/ton 1090.10 963.70 709.20
Palm oil dollars/ton 740.90 289.90 297.80
Soya dollars/ton 376.00 246.80 204.20
Sugar cents/kg 80.17 27.67 19.90
Cotton cents/kg 261.70 181.90 110.30
Copper dollars/ton 2770.00 2661.00 1645.00
Lead cents/kg 115.00 81.10 49.60
Table 2
Commodity price declines, 1980-2001
Source: Touissant, E. (2005), Your Money or Your Life, Chicago, Haymarket Books, p. 157.
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boom in some commodity prices reflected strong Chinese import de-
mand and the East Asian recovery from the 1997-98 depression in 
four key countries; from a very low base in early 2002, the prices of 
agricultural products rose 80% and metals/minerals doubled. Perhaps 
most spectacularly, the rise of the oil price from $11/barrel to $70/bar-
rel from 1998-2005 meant that price volatility did indeed assist a few 
countries. but the soaring price of energy came at the expense of most 
of Africa, which imports oil. 
supporters of the status quo argue that there are mitigating fac-
tors in the world trading system designed to offer Africa a safety net. 
but ‘preferential access’ that permits somewhat greater Northern im-
ports from Africa represents only 1% of world trade volume. And the 
‘special and Differential Treatment’ (sDT) concessions grudgingly 
provided some Third World exports are typically hard-fought and 
minimal, as Tetteh hormeku of the Africa Trade Network explains:
Countries at different stages of growth and development should not 
assume the same level of responsibilities in international agreements 
as these are unequal partners. but by end of the Uruguay Round the 
spirit of sDT was reduced to a narrower concept: developing countries 
had to essentially accept the same obligations as developed countries, 
and may be exempted from implementing some measures, as well 
as allowed different time scales. but almost all obligations would be 
adopted by them… [At Doha,] over 200 proposals were made relat-
ing first to strengthening sDT and second to resolving implementation 
issues. since the Round has been launched, all discussions on sDT 
and implementation issues have made no progress, except on 22 issues 
which are widely described as of having little or no commercial value 
(hormeku, 2005).
A related problem is the northern agricultural subsidy system, which 
is worth several hundred billion dollars a year, whether for domes-
tic market stabilization (in an earlier era) or export promotion. over-
productive European, Us and Japanese agro-industrial corporations 
producers find African markets in the form of dumped grains and 
foodstuffs. Rarely examined, however, are the differential impacts of 
subsidies, especially when associated with glutted global agricultural 
markets. This is a general problem associated with export-led growth, 
but is particularly acute in the farming sector because of uneven ac-
cess to state subsidies, especially affecting export crops. 
it is not only a matter of much lower national-scale productive 
potential in the Third World than would have been the case had lib-
eralization not decimated many local industries, including domestic 
farming. in the process, rapid trade-related integration caused grow-
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ing social inequality, as branco Milanovic has reported (Milanovic, 
2002). Those who benefited most include the import/export firms, 
transport/shipping companies, plantations and large-scale commer-
cial farmers, the mining sector, financiers (who gain greater security 
than in the case of produce designed for the domestic market), con-
sumers of imported goods, and politicians and bureaucrats who are 
tapped into the commercial/financial circuits. 
Agricultural subsidies are merely one aspect of growing rural ine-
quality. Farm subsidies today mainly reflect agro-corporate campaign 
contributions and the importance of rural voting blocs in advanced 
capitalist countries. (in the 1930s, the first generation of Us farm sub-
sidies instead reflected the dangers of agricultural overproduction to 
society and ecology, for the ‘dust bowl’ phenomenon in the Midwest 
emerged when many family farmers simply left their failing lands fal-
low after markets were glutted.)
The power of the agro-corporate lobby is substantial and getting 
stronger. The UN Development Programme found that agricultural 
subsidies had risen 15% between the late 1980s and 2004, from $243 
billion to $279 billion (a figure Vandana shiva considers a vast un-
derestimate), with Japan (56%) relatively most subsidy-intensive in 
relation to the total value of agricultural production, compared to the 
EU (33%) and Us (18%) (United Nations Development Programme, 
2005:19).
Unlike earlier periods when farming was smaller-scale and at-
omized, advanced capitalist countries’ agricultural subsidies today 
overwhelmingly benefit large agro-corporate producers. subsidies in 
the EU’s fifteen major countries are even more unequally distributed 
than the Us, with beneficiaries in britain including Queen Elizbeth ii 
($1.31 million), Prince Charles ($480,000) and britain’s richest man, 
the Duke of Westminster ($1.13 million)8 (sharma, 2005a). studies of 
the Gini coefficients of northern agriculture subsidy recipients, as re-
ported by the UNDP, confirm that large farming corporations benefit 
far more than do small farmers. in 2001, the EU 15’s Gini coefficient 
was 78 and the Us coefficient was 67, both far higher than income 
distribution in the world’s most unequal countries (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2005: 130). Were political power relations 
to change, a massive redirection of subsidies to small, lower-income, 
8 sharma argues that in response: “Developing countries should ask for: agricul-
tural subsidies to be classified under two categories: one which benefits small farm-
ers and the remaining which goes to agri-business companies and the big farmers/
landowners; and since less than 20% of the $1 billion farm subsidy being doled out 
every day genuinely benefit small farmers, the remaining 80% subsidies need to be 
outright scrapped before proceeding any further on agriculture negotiations.”
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family farmers in the North would be more equitable and could have 
the effect of moving agricultural production towards more organic 
(and less petroleum-intensive) farming. 
A detailed debate regularly occurs over whether subsidies are 
‘trade-distorting’. if they represent export subsidies or price supports, 
these subsidies belong in what the WTo terms an ‘Amber box’, targeted 
for elimination. Export subsidies of $7.5 billion in 1995 were reduced, 
as a result, to $3 billion by 2001. Formerly trade-distorting subsidies 
were reformed by the EU, with the new aim of limiting production of 
crops (farmers are paid to simply leave land fallow), and are hence 
‘Green box’: not subject to cuts. The Us government proposed that 
the large counter-cyclical payments it makes to Us cotton producers 
when the price declines should not be considered amber, even though 
the WTo itself agreed with brazilian complaints that the subsidies 
still distort trade by increasing Us output and lowering world prices. 
Generally, the complexity associated with the subsidy regimes reflects 
Northern capacity to maintain their subsidies but continually dress 
them up in new language (sharma, 2005b).
What impact would the removal of northern agricultural subsi-
dies have in Africa? Explicit agro-export subsidies, which account 
for less than 1% of the total and are mainly provided by the EU, will 
finally cease in 2013, thanks to concessions at the hong kong WTo 
summit. (implicit EU export subsidies worth 55 billion euros will 
continue, however.) This reform aside, the most important debate 
is over whether substantive reductions would genuinely benefit Af-
rican peasants. 
one problem is that power relations prevailing in the world ag-
ricultural markets allow huge cartels to handle shipping and distri-
bution, and they usually gain the first round of benefits when prices 
change. A second problem is that local land ownership patterns typi-
cally emphasise plantation-based export agriculture, with the danger 
that further cash crop incentives will crowd out land used for food 
cropping by peasants. No reliable studies exist to make definitive 
statements. There are, indeed, African heads of state in food-import-
ing countries who advocate continuing EU agricultural subsidies for 
a third reason, because lower crop prices reduces their own costs of 
feeding their citizenry. 
in sum, two crucial questions associated with subsidies and 
agricultural exports are typically elided by neoliberal economists 
and other pro-trade campaigners: which forces in Northern socie-
ties benefit from subsidies that promote export-orientation, in both 
the short- and long-term?; and which forces in southern societies 
would win and lose in the event exports are lifted? Furthermore, the 
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crucial strategic question is whether self-reliant development strate-
gies –which were the necessary (if insufficient) condition for most 
industrialization in the past– can be applied if low-income export-
ing countries remain mired in the commodity trap. The same points 
must be raised again below with respect to Africa’s mineral exports, 
where depletion of nonrenewable resources drains the wealth of fu-
ture generations. 
but a final reflection of trade-related power relations was also un-
veiled in hong kong. For Walden bello, the most disturbing political 
development was that india and brazil structurally shifted their loca-
tion from an alliance with 110 Third World countries, to the core of 
the ‘Five interested Parties’ (joining the Us, EU and Australia) which 
cut the final deal: 
in the end, the developing country governments caved in, many of 
them motivated solely by the fear of getting saddled with the blame for 
the collapse of the organization. Even Cuba and Venezuela confined 
themselves to registering only ‘reservations’ with the services text dur-
ing the closing session of the ministerial… The main gain for brazil 
and india lay not in the impact of the agreement on their economies 
but in the affirmation of their new role as power brokers within the 
WTo 9 (bello, 2005).
Investment, production and exploitation 
Africa, meanwhile, remains disempowered on fronts ranging from 
trade to direct investment. Walter Rodney described foreign direct in-
vestment in stark terms: 
Under colonialism the ownership was complete and backed by mili-
tary domination. Today, in many African countries the foreign owner-
ship is still present, although the armies and flags of foreign powers 
have been removed. so long as foreigners own land, mines, factories, 
banks, insurance companies, means of transportation, newspapers, 
power stations, etc. then for so long will the wealth of Africa flow 
outwards into the hands of those elements. in other words, in the ab-
sence of direct political control, foreign investment ensures that the 
natural resources and the labour of Africa produce economic value 
which is lost to the continent (Rodney, 1981).
in recent years, Africa has not been overwhelmed by interest from for-
eign corporate suitors. During the early 1970s, roughly a third of all FDi 
9 bello particularly blames brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim and indian 
commerce minister kamal Nath.
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to the Third World went to sub-saharan African countries, especially 
apartheid south Africa. by the 1990s, that statistic had dropped to 5%. 
Aside from oil field exploitation, the only other substantive foreign in-
vestments over the last decade were in south Africa, for the partial pri-
vatization of the state telecommunications agency and for the expan-
sion of automotive-sector branch plant activity within global assembly 
lines. These inflows were by far offset by south Africa’s own outflows 
of foreign direct investment, in the forms of relocation of the largest 
corporations’ financial headquarters to London, which in turn distorted 
the Africa FDi data, not to mention the repatriation of dividends/profits, 
payments of patent/royalty fees to transnational corporations. 
one of the most careful analysts of foreign corporate domination 
of African economies, UN Research institute for social Development 
director Thandika Mkandawire, recently studied African economies’ 
‘maladjustment’ and concluded, ‘Little FDi has gone into the manu-
facturing industry. As for investment in mining, it is not drawn to Af-
rican countries by macroeconomic policy changes, as is often suggest-
ed, but by the prospects of better world prices, changes in attitudes 
towards national ownership and sector specific incentives’. Moreover, 
14% of FDi was ‘driven by acquisitions facilitated by the increased 
pace of privatization to buy up existing plants that are being sold, usu-
ally under “fire sale” conditions’. What little new manufacturing in-
vestment occurred was typically ‘for expansion of existing capacities, 
especially in industries enjoying natural monopolies (e.g. beverages, 
cement, furniture). such expansion may have been stimulated by the 
spurt of growth that caused much euphoria and that is now fading 
away’ (Mkandawire, 2005:6). According to Mkandawire:
it is widely recognized that direct investment is preferable to portfolio 
investment, and foreign investment in ‘green field’ investments is prefer-
able to acquisitions. The predominance of these [portfolio and aquisi-
tion] types of capital inflows should be cause for concern. however, in 
their desperate efforts to attract foreign investment, African governments 
have simply ceased dealing with these risks or suggesting that they may 
have a preference for one type of foreign investment over all others. Fi-
nally, such investment is likely to taper off within a short span of time, as 
already seems to be the case in a number of African countries.
Thus, for Ghana, hailed as a ‘success story’ by the bretton Woods in-
stitutions, FDi, which peaked in the mid-1980s at over $200 million 
annually –mainly due to privatization– was rapidly reversed to pro-
duce a negative outflow. it should be noted, in passing, that rates of 
return of direct investments have generally been much higher in Africa 
than in other developing regions. This, however, has not made Africa 
a favourite among investors, largely because of considerations of the 
intangible ‘risk factor’ nurtured by the tendency to treat the contingent 
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as homogenous and a large dose of ignorance about individual Afri-
can countries. There is considerable evidence that shows that Africa is 
systematically rated as more risky than is warranted by the underlying 
economic characteristics” (Mkandawire, 2005:7). 
The critique of foreign investors in Africa must now extend beyond the 
EU, Us and Japan, to China. For example, the Chinese National Petrole-
um Corporation (CNPC) and two other large Chinese oil firms are active 
in seventeen African countries. one is sudan where $2 billion of oil invest-
ments are underway notwithstanding the Darfur genocide, responsible 
already for of 5% of China’s import requirements, along with Chinese-fi-
nanced development of a homegrown sudanese military capacity. (Arms 
sales to Robert Mugabe are also dubious.) As ben schiller reports,
Concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of various 
Chinese-run mining operations in Africa, including copper mines in 
Zambia and Congo, and titanium sands projects in ecologically sensi-
tive parts of Mozambique, kenya, Tanzania, and Madagascar. 
Moreover, China is a major importer of illegal timber from forests in 
indonesia, Cameroon, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. Though accu-
rate figures are hard to access, www.globaltimber.org.uk says that up 
to 50% of all timber imported to China in 2004 was illegal. Chinese 
businesses have also been implicated in ivory smuggling, notably in 
sudan and Zimbabwe. According to Care for the Wild international, 
Chinese companies buy up to 75% of sudan’s ivory. 
in its rush to expand, development experts say China is reinvigorating 
an older, crude style of development, re-establishing an era of ‘white 
elephants’ and ‘prestige projects’ with little benefit to local people. in 
Ethiopia, the Chinese state-owned Jiangxi international built $4 mil-
lion worth of new housing, after a flood left hundreds destitute. but 
instead of accommodating the homeless, the blocks ended up being 
used by military officials. A Jiangxi manager later told the Wall Street 
Journal: “it was a political task for us and so long as Ethiopia officials 
are happy, our goal is fulfilled” (schiller, 2005).
Given that mining houses have been central to looting Africa for at 
least a century and a half, it is fitting to next consider the damage done 
by depletion of minerals and other non-renewable natural resources. 
FDI and resource depletion 
in the most brazen case, the oil sector demonstrates how profit and 
dividend outflows, often lubricated by corruption, have had extremely 
negative consequences. As demonstrated by the open society-backed 
campaign, ‘Publish what you Pay’, elites in Africa’s oil producing coun-
tries –Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and 
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sudan– are amongst the world’s least transparent10. in Nigeria, de-
mands by the ogoni people relate not only to the massive destruction 
of their Delta habitat, but also to the looting of their natural wealth by 
big oil. According to sam olukoya, 
Reparations is a crucial issue in the struggle for environmental jus-
tice in Nigeria. Many of the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta have 
drawn up various demands. A key document is the ogoni bill of 
Rights which seeks reparations from shell for environmental pol-
lution, devastation and ecological degradation of the ogoni area. 
shell’s abuses in ogoniland were made infamous by the late play-
wright and activist ken saro-Wiwa, who was executed by the Nige-
rian government (olukoya, 2001).
in all these respects, diverse forces in society have moved away from 
considering oil merely a matter of private property, to be negotiat-
ed between corporations and governments, as was the case during 
much of the 20th century. instead, these forces now treat oil as part 
of a general ‘commons’ of a national society’s natural capital. George 
Caffentzis explains:
 
There are three levels of claims to petroleum as common property, cor-
relating with three kinds of allied communities that are now taking 
shape, for there is no common property without a community that 
regulates its use:
– first, some local communities most directly affected by the extrac-
tion of petroleum claim to own and regulate the petroleum under 
its territory as a commons; 
– second, islamic economists claim for the islamic community of 
believers, from Morocco to indonesia, and its representative, the 
21st century Caliphate in formation, ownership of and the right to 
regulate the huge petroleum fields beneath their vast territory; 
– third, UN officials claim for the ‘coming global community’ the 
right to regulate the so-called global commons: air, water, land, 
minerals (including petroleum) and ‘nous’ (knowledge and infor-
mation). This imagined global community is to be represented 
by a dizzying array of ‘angels’ that make up the UN system, from 
NGo activists to UN environmentalist bureaucrats to World bank 
‘green’ advisors” (Caffentzis, 2004).
From a september 2005 conference in Johannesburg organized by the 
south African NGo groundWork, delegates petitioned the World Pe-
troleum Congress: 
10 <http://www.opensociety.org>
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At every point in the fossil fuel production chain where your mem-
bers ‘add value’ and make profit, ordinary people, workers and their 
environments are assaulted and impoverished. Where oil is drilled, 
pumped, processed and used, in Africa as elsewhere, ecological sys-
tems have been trashed, peoples’ livelihoods have been destroyed and 
their democratic aspirations and their rights and cultures trampled… 
Your energy future is modeled on the interests of over-consuming, en-
ergy-intensive, fossil-fuel-burning wealthy classes whose reckless and 
selfish lifestyles not only impoverish others but threaten the global en-
vironment, imposing on all of us the chaos and uncertainty of climate 
change and the violence and destruction of war. Another energy future 
is necessary: yours has failed!11. 
in a remarkable essay, ‘seeing like an oil company’, anthropologist James 
Ferguson argues that ‘capital “hops” over “unusable Africa”, alighting 
only in mineral-rich enclaves that are starkly disconnected from their 
national societies. The result is not the formation of standardized na-
tional grids, but the emergence of huge areas of the continent that are 
effectively “off the grid”. in the process, there emerges ‘a frightening 
sort of political–economic model for regions that combine mineral 
wealth with political intractability’, ranging from African oil zones to 
occupied iraq. The model includes protection of capital by ‘private 
military companies’ (in baghdad, blackwater, Erinys and Global Risk 
strategies), and protection of the ‘big Man’ leader (Paul bremer, John 
Negroponte) ‘not by his own national army but, instead, by hired guns’ 
(Ferguson, 2005: 381). The bottom line is enhanced profit for interna-
tional capital and despotism for the citizenry. 
of interest, though, is that in the wake of higher consciousness re-
garding full environmental accounting, some of the costs of this model 
are now being measured at even the World bank. Along with this we are 
entering a potentially fruitful period in which the depletion of natural re-
sources plus associated negative externalities –such as the social devasta-
tion caused by mining operations– can now begin to be taken seriously as 
a way of envisioning a global commons. That entails at least a rough ac-
counting of the costs associated with tearing resources from the ground, 
forests and fisheries, even as we continue to recognize that many aspects 
of valuation –human life’s worth, indigenous people’s traditions and cul-
ture, aesthetics of the natural environment– are impossible to quantify. 
Accounting for nature 
because of the legacy of environmental economists such as herman 
Daly, even the World bank has begun to address the question of re-
11 <http://www.groundwork.org.za>.
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source depletion, in Where is the Wealth of Nations?, using the meth-
odology of correcting bias in GDP wealth account surprisingly, this is 
nowhere near as expansive as parallel efforts by groups such as san 
Francisco-based Redefining Progress12. There, statisticians subtract 
from GDP the cost of crime and family breakdown; add household 
and volunteer work; correct for income distribution (rewarding equal-
ity); subtract resource depletion; subtract pollution; subtract long-
term environmental damage (climate change, nuclear waste genera-
tion); add opportunities for increased leisure time; factor in lifespan 
of consumer durables and public infrastructure; and subtract vulner-
ability upon foreign assets. Using this approach and accounting for 
natural resource depletion, pollution and the other factors that, in the 
aggregate, comprise the onset of the era marked by neoliberalism, glo-
balisation and the ecological crisis, global welfare began declining in 
absolute terms during the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, the bank’s tenta-
tive approach is at least a step forward in recognizing that extractive 
investments may not contribute to net welfare, and indeed may cause 
national savings and wealth to actually shrink, along with their better 
known qualitative manifestations. 
12 <http://www.redefiningprogess.org.>.
Source: www.redefiningprogress.org
Figure 1
Global GDP versus a genuine progress indicator, 1950-2003
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The bank’s first-cut method subtracts from the existing rate of savings 
factors such as fixed capital depreciation, depletion of natural resources 
and pollution, but then adds investments in education (defined as annu-
al expenditure). The result, in most African countries dependent upon 
primary products, is a net negative rate of national savings to Gross 
National income (GNi). Notwithstanding some problems, the bank’s 
methodology at least indicates some of the trends associated with raw 
materials extraction. in making estimates about the decline in a coun-
try’s wealth due to energy, mineral or forest-related depletion, the World 
bank adopts a minimalist definition based upon international pricing 
(not potential future values when scarcity becomes a more crucial fac-
tor, especially in the oil industry). Moreover, the bank does not fully cal-
culate damages done to the local environment, to workers’ health/safety, 
and especially to women in communities around mines. And the bank’s 
use of average –not marginal– cost resource rents also underestimates 
the depletion costs. in particular, the attempt to generate a ‘genuine sav-
ings’ calculation requires adjusting net national savings to account for 
resource depletion. The bank suggests the following steps: 
From gross national saving the consumption of fixed capital is subtract-
ed to give the traditional indicator of saving: net national savings. The 
value of damages from pollutants is subtracted. The pollutants carbon 
dioxide and particulate matter are included. The value of natural re-
source depletion is subtracted. Energy, metals and mineral and net for-
est depletion are included. Current operating expenditures on education 
are added to net national saving to adjust for investments in human 
capital (World bank, 2005a: 39).
Naturally, given oil extraction, the Middle East region (including 
North Africa) has the world’s most serious problem of net nega-
tive gross national income and savings under this methodology. but 
sub-saharan Africa is second worst, and for several years during 
the early 1990s witnessed net negative GNi for the continent once 
extraction of natural resources was factored in. indeed, for every 
percentage point increase in a country’s extractive-resource depend-
ency, that country’s potential GDP declines by 9% (as against the real 
GDP recorded), according to the bank (World bank, 2005a: 55). Af-
rican countries with the combined highest resource dependence and 
lowest capital accumulation included Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritania, 
Gabon, Congo, Algeria and south Africa. in comparing the poten-
tial for capital accumulation –i.e., were resource rents not simply 
extracted (and exported) and resources depleted– on the one hand 
and, on the other, the actual measure of capital accumulation, bank 
researchers discovered that,
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in many cases the differences are huge. Nigeria, a major oil exporter, 
could have had a year 2000 stock of produced capital five times higher 
than the actual stock. Moreover, if these investments had taken place, 
oil would play a much smaller role in the Nigerian economy today, 
with likely beneficial impacts on policies affecting other sectors of the 
economy (World bank, 2005a: 55).
A more nuanced breakdown of a country’s estimated ‘tangible wealth’ is 
required to capture not just obvious oil-related depletion and rent out-
flows, but also other subsoil assets, timber resources, nontimber forest 
resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland. The ‘produced 
capital’ normally captured in GDP accounting is added to the tangible 
wealth. in the case of Ghana, that amounted to $2,022 per capita in 
2000. The same year, the Gross National saving of Ghana was $40 per 
capita and education spending was $7. These figures require downward 
adjustment to account for the consumption of fixed capital ($19), as 
well as the depletion of wealth in the form of stored energy ($0), min-
erals ($4) and net forest assets ($8). in Ghana, the adjusted net saving 
was $16 per capita in 2000. but given population growth  of 1.7%, the 
country’s wealth actually shrunk by $18 per capita in 2000 (World bank, 
2005a: 64-65).
how much of this exploitation is based on transnational capital’s extrac-
tive power? in the case of Ghana, $12 of the $18 decline in 2000 could be 
Tangible wealth Adjusted net saving
Subsoil assets $65 Gross National Saving $40
Timber resources $290 Education expenditure $7
Nontimber forest resources $76 Consumption fixed capital $-19
Protected areas $7 Energy depletion $0
Cropland $855 Mineral depletion $-4
Pastureland $43 Net forest depletion $-8
Produced capital $686  
Total tangible wealth $2022 Adjusted net saving $16
Population growth 1.7% Change in wealth per capita $-18
Table 3
Adjustment to Ghana’s 2000 savings rate based upon tangible wealth and resource depletion (per capita $)
Source: World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, pp.64-65. 
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attributed to minerals and forest-related depletions, a large proportion 
of which now leaves Ghana (World bank, 2005a: 64-65). The largest in-
digenous (and black-owned) mining firm in Africa, Ashanti, was recently 
bought by AngloGold, so it is safe to assume than an increasing amount 
of Ghana’s wealth flows out of the country, leaving net negative per capita 
tangible wealth. other mining houses active in Africa which once had 
their roots here –Lonrho, Anglo, Debeers, Gencor/billiton– are also now 
based off-shore. 
it is logical to assume that an increased drive by London, New 
York and sydney shareholders for profits results in accumulation of 
capital within Africa being systematically stymied. The central ques-
tion is whether any of the financial capital that returns to Africa –by 
way of royalties on minerals or profits to local shareholders (still sig-
nificant in the case of south Africa)– is reinvested, or merely becomes 
the source of further capital flight.
Ghana was an interesting example given that it has often played 
the role of World bank poster child country. other African countries 
whose economies are primary product dependent fare much worse, 
according to the bank methodology. Gabon’s citizens lost $2,241 
each in 2000, as oil companies rapidly depleted the country’s tangi-
ble wealth. The Republic of the Congo (-$727), Nigeria (-$210), Cam-
eroon (-$152), Mauritania (-$147) and Cote d’ivoire (-$100) are other 
African countries whose people lost more than $100 in tangible na-
tional wealth each in 2000 alone. (Angola would rank high amongst 
these, were data available for the bank’s analysis.) A few countries 
did benefit, according to the tangible wealth measure, including the 
seychelles (+$904), botswana (+$814) and Namibia (+$140), but 
the majority of African countries saw their wealth depleted (World 
bank, 2005a: 66).
Even Africa’s largest economy, south Africa, which from the ear-
ly 1980s has been far less reliant upon minerals extraction, recorded 
a $2 drop in per capita wealth in 2000 using this methodology. Ac-
cording to the World bank, the natural wealth of $3,400/person in 
south Africa included subsoil assets (worth $1,118 per person)13; 
timber ($310); non-timber forest resources ($46); protected areas 
($51); cropland ($1,238); pastureland ($637). This sum can be com-
pared to the value of produced capital (plant and equipment) and 
urban land (together worth $7,270 per person in 2000). hence even 
in Africa’s most industrialized economy, the estimated value of natu-
13 According to a different study by the United Nations Development Programme, the 
value of minerals in the soil fell from $112 billion in 1960 to $55 billion in 2000. see 
United Nations Development Programme (2004).
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ral wealth is nearly half of the measurable value of plant, equipment 
and urban land14. 
in part, minerals depletion and associated pollution costs are 
a function of expanded foreign direct investment. Even in south 
Africa, with a 150-year old organic mining-based bourgeoisie, 
mineral depletion today disproportionately benefits overseas min-
ing houses (especially given that some of the largest Johannes-
burg firms relisted their primary share residences to London after 
1994). in addition, Co2 emissions plus a great deal of other pol-
lution (especially so2) are largely the result of energy large mul-
tinational corporations (Mittal steel, bhP billiton and the Anglo 
group). Any assessment of FDi, especially in oil and resource rich 
countries, must henceforth take into account its contribution to 
the net negative impact on national wealth, including the depletion 
and degradation of the resource base. ironically, given the source 
of leadership at the World bank (Paul Wolfowitz of the Us petro-
military complex), the bank’s new accounting of genuine savings 
is a helpful innovation. Taking the methodology forward in order 
to correct biases, and rigorously estimating an Africa-wide extrac-
tion measure in order to better account for the way extractive FDi 
generates net negative welfare/savings, still remain as important 
exercises. 
There are many other modes of surplus and resource extraction 
through FDi, involving swindling. For example, corporate failure to 
pay taxes and state failure to collect them is a point stressed by Law-
rence Cockcroft of Transparency international:
Most African countries operate some form of tax break for new inves-
tors, with varying degrees of generosity. in fact such incentive schemes 
are frequently deceptive in that the real deal is being done in spite 
of them and alongside them, with a key cabinet minister or official 
coming to an alternative arrangement which may well guarantee an 
offshore payment for the individual in question as well as a ‘tax holi-
day’ for the company concerned (Cockcroft, 2001: 2).
14 Given the constant depletion of this natural capital, south Africa’s official gross 
national savings rate of 15.7% of GDi therefore should be adjusted downwards. by 
subtracting consumption of fixed capital at 13.3%, the net national savings is actually 
2.4%, added to which should be education expenditure (amongst the world’s highest) 
at 7.5%. Then subtract mineral depletion of 1%; forest depletion of 0.3%; 0.2% pollu-
tion damage (limited to ‘particulate matter’, a small part of south Africa’s waste prob-
lem); and Co2 emissions worth 1.6% of GDi (a serious undervaluation). in total, the 
actual ‘genuine savings’ of south Africa is reduced to just 6.9% of national income. 
(World bank, 2005a:.179).
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Income per 
capita ($)
Population 
growth rate 
(%)
Adjusted net 
saving per 
capita ($)
Change in 
wealth per 
capita ($)
Benin 360 2.6 14 -42
Botswana 2925 1.7 1021 814
Burkina Faso 230 2.5 15 -36
Burundi 97 1.9 -10 -37
Cameroon 548 2.2 -8 -152
CapeVerde 1195 2.7 43 -81
Chad 174 3.1 -8 -74
Comoros 367 2.5 -17 -73
Rep of Congo 660 3.2 -227 -727
Côte d’Ivoire 625 2.3 -5 -100
Ethiopia 101 2.4 -4 -27
Gabon 3370 2.3 -1183 -2241
The Gambia 305 3.4 -5 -45
Ghana 255 1.7 16 -18
Kenya 343 2.3 40 -11
Madagascar 245 3.1 9 -56
Malawi 162 2.1 -2 -29
Mali 221 2.4 20 -47
Mauritania 382 2.9 -30 -147
Mauritius 3697 1.1 645 514
Mozambique 195 2.2 15 -20
Namibia 1820 3.2 392 140
Niger 166 3.3 -10 -83
Nigeria 297 2.4 -97 -210
Rwanda 233 2.9 14 -60
Senegal 449 2.6 31 -27
Seychelles 7089 0.9 1162 904
South Africa 2837 2.5 246 -2
Swaziland 1375 2.5 129 8
Togo 285 4.0 -20 -88
Zambia 312 2.0 -13 -63
Zimbabwe 550 2.0 53 -4
Table 4
African countries’ adjusted national wealth and ‘savings gaps’, 2000
Source: World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, p.66. 
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official statistics have never properly picked up the durable problem 
of transfer pricing, whereby foreign investors misinvoice inputs drawn 
from abroad. Companies cheat Third World countries on tax revenues 
by artificially inflating their imported input prices so as to claim lower 
net income. it is only possible to guess the vast scale of the problem 
on the basis of case studies. The oxford institute of Energy studies 
estimated that in 1994, 14% of the total value of exported oil ‘was not 
accounted for in national trade figures as a result of various forms 
of transfer pricing and smuggling’ (Cockcroft, 2001: 2). According to 
a 1999 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development sur-
vey on income shifting as part of transfer pricing, ‘of the develop-
ing countries with sufficient evidence to make an assessment, 61% 
estimated that their own national transnational corporations (TNCs) 
were engaging in income shifting, and 70% deemed it a significant 
problem. The income-shifting behaviour of foreign-based TNCs was 
also appraised. 84% of the developing countries felt that the affiliates 
they hosted shifted income to their parent companies to avoid tax li-
abilities, and 87% viewed the problem as significant’ (UN Conference 
on Trade and Development, 1999: 167).
similarly, another kind of corporate financial transfer aimed at 
exploiting weak African countries is the fee that headquarters charge 
for patent and copyright fees on technology agreements. such pay-
ments, according to Yash Tandon, are augmented by management and 
consultancy fees, as well as other Northern corporate support mecha-
nisms that drain the Third World. For the year 2000, Tandon listed 
export revenue denied the south because of northern protectionism 
of more than $30 billion for non-agricultural products15.
Production, transport and the ecological debt 
Most of the systems of unequal exchange have been identified (aside 
from labour which is considered below) in an indirect manner, such 
that victims are not aware of the process, another crucial outlet for 
Northern investors to exploit Africa is in their consumption of the glo-
bal commons, particularly the earth’s clean air. During the early 1990s, 
the idea of the North’s ecological debt to the south began gaining cur-
rency in Latin America thanks to NGos, environmentalists and politi-
cians (including Fidel Castro of Cuba and Virgilio barco of Colombia). 
According to Joan Martinez-Alier, 
The notion of an ecological debt is not particularly radical. Think 
of the environmental liabilities incurred by firms (under the United 
15 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/devthry/well-being/2000/tandon.htm>. 
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states superfund legislation), or of the engineering field called ‘res-
toration ecology’, or the proposals by the swedish government in 
the early 1990s to calculate the country’s environmental debt. Eco-
logically unequal exchange is one of the reasons for the claim of the 
Ecological Debt. The second reason for this claim is the dispropor-
tionate use of Environmental space by the rich countries16 (Mar-
tinez-Alier, 2003). 
in the first category, Martinez-Alier lists:
Unpaid costs of reproduction or maintenance or sustainable man-
agement of the renewable resources that have been exported; 
actualized costs of the future lack of availability of destroyed 
natural resources; 
compensation for, or the costs of reparation (unpaid) of the lo-
cal damages produced by exports (for example, the sulphur di-
oxide of copper smelters, the mine tailings, the harms to health 
from flower exports, the pollution of water by mining), or the 
actualized value of irreversible damage; 
(unpaid) amount corresponding to the commercial use of in-
formation and knowledge on genetic resources, when they have 
been appropriated gratis (‘biopiracy’). For agricultural genetic 
resources, the basis for such a claim already exists under the 
FAo’s Farmers’ Rights. 
in the second, he cites ‘lack of payment for environmental services or 
for the disproportionate use of Environmental space’:
(unpaid) reparation costs or compensation for the impacts 
caused by imports of solid or liquid toxic waste; 
(unpaid) costs of free disposal of gas residues (carbon dioxide, 
CFCs, etc), assuming equal rights to sinks and reservoirs. 
16 Martinez-Alier elaborates with examples of ecological debt that are never factored 
into standard trade and investment regimes: ‘nutrients in exports including virtual 
water… the oil and minerals no longer available, the biodiversity destroyed. This is 
a difficult figure to compute, for several reasons. Figures on the reserves, estimation 
of the technological obsolence because of substitution, and a decision on the rate 
of discount are needed in the case of minerals or oil. For biodiversity, knowledge 
of what is being destroyed would be needed.’ some of these cases are considered in 
the discussion earlier concerning depletion of natural capital. see also <http://www.
deudaecologica.org>.
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These aspects of ecological debt defy easy measurement. Each part of the 
ecological balance sheet is highly contested, and information is imper-
fect. As Martinez-Alier shows in other work, tropical rainforests used for 
wood exports have an extraordinary past we will never know and ongo-
ing biodiversity whose destruction we cannot begin to value. however, he 
acknowledges, ‘although it is not possible to make an exact accounting, it 
is necessary to establish the principal categories [of ecological debt] and 
certain orders of magnitude in order to stimulate discussion’ (Martinez-
Alier, 1998). 
The sums involved are potentially vast. Vandana shiva and Tandon 
estimate that biopiracy of ‘wild seed varieties have contributed some 
$66 billion annually to the Us economy’17. Moreover, in the case of 
Co2 emissions, according to Martinez-Alier,
Jyoti Parikh (a member of the UN international Panel on Climate 
Change) [argues that] if we take the present human-made emissions of 
carbon, the average is about one tonne per person per year. industrial-
ized countries produce three-fourths of these emissions, instead of the 
one-fourth that would correspond to them on the basis of population. 
The difference is 50% of total emissions, some 3000 million tons. here 
the increasing marginal cost of reduction is contemplated: the first 1000 
million tons could be reduced at a cost of, say, $15 per ton, but then the 
cost increases very much. Let us take an average of $25: then a total an-
nual subsidy of $75 billion is forthcoming from south to North18.
Excess use of the planet’s Co2 absorption capacity is merely one of the 
many ways that the south is being exploited by the North on the ecolog-
ical front. Africans are most exploited in this regard because non-indus-
trialized economics have not begun to utilize more than a small fraction 
of what should be due under any fair framework of global resource al-
location. The amounts involved would easily cover debt repayments. 
A final way in which Africa’s wealth is depleted is via skilled labour 
migration. This problem has become important, even if it is slightly 
mitigated by the inflow of migrant remittance payments to families at 
home. Approximately 20,000 skilled workers leave Africa each year. 
The World bank’s estimate of the share of Africa’s skilled workers with 
a tertiary education who emigrate is more than 15%, higher than any 
other region. it is true that remittances from both skilled and unskilled 
labour flow back to Africa as a result, and in some cases represent 
an important contribution to GDP. but as the World bank concedes, 
17 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/devthry/well-being/2000/tandon.htm>. 
18 Martinez-Alier cites Parikh, J. k. (1995). 
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there are extremely high transaction costs (sometimes 20%) imposed 
upon the small sums that are transferred by migrants. For this reason, 
a great deal of migration-related inflows to Africa have become infor-
mal in nature, via black market systems, and in turn, once the flows 
reach their home destination, further problems often emerge, accord-
ing to sarah bracking: 
While money sent from the ‘other side’ has a beneficial effect on close 
kin, remittances can also undermine the purchasing power of those 
households without migrating members. This is in part a result of as-
set price inflation, and in part due to the inflationary effects of paral-
lel currency markets. The situation for those excluded from benefiting 
from foreign currency inputs is aggravated by chronic scarcity in the 
availability of consumables” (bracking, 2003: 633).
The progressive position on migration has always been to maintain 
support for the ‘globalization of people’ (while opposing the ‘globali-
zation of capital’) and in the process to oppose border controls and 
arduous immigration restrictions, as well as all forms of xenophobia. 
in october 2005, North Africans were expelled from the Moroccan-
spanish border at Granada by lethal force, and the supposedly pro-
gressive Zapatero regime announced it would build the equivalent of 
israel’s notorious apartheid wall at the border. it was, according to 
slavoj Žižek, just another symptom of Fortress Europe: 
A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the EU passed almost 
unnoticed: a plan to establish an all-European border police force to 
secure the isolation of the Union territory, so as to prevent the influx 
of the immigrants. This is the truth of globalization: the construc-
tion of new walls safeguarding the prosperous Europe from a flood of 
immigrants… 
The segregation of the people is the reality of economic globalization. 
This new racism of the developed world is in a way much more brutal 
than the previous one. its implicit legitimization is neither naturalist 
(the ‘natural’ superiority of the developed West) nor culturalist (we in 
the West also want to preserve our cultural identity). Rather, it’s an 
unabashed economic egotism - the fundamental divide is the one be-
tween those included into the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity 
and those excluded from it19 (Žižek, 2005).
19 Žižek continues, ‘it is thus becoming clear that the solution is not “tear down the 
walls and let them all in,” the easy, empty demand often put forth by soft-hearted 
liberal “radicals.” Rather, the real solution is to tear down the true wall, not the po-
lice one, but the social-economic one: To change society so that people will no longer 
desperately try to escape their own world.’
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According to Yash Tandon and the UN Development Programme, 
there is a substantial ‘loss of revenue on account of blockage on the 
free movement of people’, which they estimated to amount to at least 
$25 billion annually during the 1980s. but setting such numbers 
aside, in migration and many other forms of North-south power, it is 
also important to recognize an important basis for superexploitation 
within patriarchal power relations. in many (though not all) cases, 
women face such disempowering conditions across Africa that 
political-economic and human-environmental systems permit the 
processes discussed above –debt/finance, trade, investment and labour 
migration– to maintain inordinately high rates of exploitation. 
Conclusion: From looting to liberation 
The looting of Africa dates back many centuries, to the point at 
which value transfers began via appropriation of slave labour, an-
tiquities, precious metals and raw materials. Unfair terms of trade 
were soon amplified by colonial and neocolonial relations. These 
processes often amounted to a kind of ‘primitive accumulation’, by 
which capital of Northern countries grew by virtue of looting Africa. 
This was not a once-off set of problems, solved by the 1950s-90s in-
dependence struggles. in recent decades, wealth extraction through 
imperialist relations has intensified, and some of the same kinds of 
primitive looting tactics are now once again evident. Moreover, key 
causes of Africa’s underdevelopment since the early 1980s can also 
be identified within the framework of neoliberal (free market) poli-
cies adopted nearly universally across the continent and indeed the 
world, in part thanks to the emergence of local allies of the North 
within African states. 
The mainstream impression –e.g., Tony blair’s Africa Com- 
mission– is mistaken when citing what appears as a vast inflow 
of aid, for more than 60% –so-called ‘phantom aid’– is redirected 
backwards to the donors or otherwise misses the mark in various 
ways. instead of a sustainable level of debt service payments, as 
claimed by those supporting the elites’ limited debt relief schemes, 
Africa’s net financial accounts went negative during the 1990s. And 
although remittances from the African Diaspora now fund a limited 
amount of capital accumulation, capital flight is far greater. At more 
than $10 billion/year since the early 1970s, collectively, the citizens 
of Nigeria, the ivory Coast, the DRC, Angola and Zambia have 
been especially vulnerable to the overseas drain of their national 
wealth. in addition to the lifting of exchange controls, a major factor 
during the late 1990s was financial deregulation. in south Africa, 
for example, financial liberalization included the relisting of the 
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primary share-issuing residence of the largest south African firms: 
from Johannesburg to London.
Likewise, trade liberalization has, according to Christian Aid, cost 
sub-saharan Africa $272 billion since the early 1980s. Trade is espe-
cially difficult to rely upon for growth, given that agricultural subsi-
dies accruing to Northern farmers rose from the late 1980s to 2004 by 
15%, to $279 billion, mainly benefiting large agro-corporate producers. 
Flows of people –a veritable brain drain– have also been formidable, but 
the value of wealth lost to the process is incalculable, given that more 
than 15% of Africa’s best-educated professionals now live abroad.
Non-financial investment flows are driven less by policy –although 
liberalization has also been important– and more by accumulation op-
portunities. Foreign Direct investment to sub-saharan began rising in 
the late 1990s after two decades of stagnation. but the vast bulk of in-
vestments were accounted for in two major processes: south African 
capital’s changed domicile, and resurgent oil investments (especially 
in Angola and Nigeria). 
in the latter cases, a report by the World bank acknowledges 
stagnant and net negative ‘genuine savings’ in countries with high re-
source dependence and low capital accumulation. Moreover, much of 
Africa –including south Africa– has been victimized by privatization-
related foreign investment. Transparency international blames part 
of the ‘disappointment in many African countries’ upon corruption. 
other forms of corruption occur through tax fraud and transfer pric-
ing. Ecological debt that the North owes the south, especially Africa, 
is also vast. only some of these factors are incorporated in the alterna-
tive accounting systems of the World bank and other ecological and 
social indicators such as Redefining Progress (which to be fair doesn’t 
specify country-level data in sites like Africa). 
in response, progressive African activists and allied intellectu-
als should be increasingly capable of building upon their citizenries’ 
profound skepticism of ruling elites. According to Afrobarometer polls 
and the World Values Survey, ‘Africans care about equity and public ac-
tion to reduce poverty. They are less comfortable with wide wealth dif-
ferentials, and have a strong commitment to political equality. About 
75% of the respondents agree that African governments are doing too 
little for people trapped in poverty’ (World bank, 2005b: 5). The chal-
lenge will be to establish not only alternative conceptions of poverty 
and inequality so that the broader structural processes of accumula-
tion by dispossession are clear –but also a different approach to public 
policy and politics.
Those conceptions are not limited to a set of policy reforms (though 
such can be provided whenever necessary, drawing upon real experiences 
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in history and across the contemporary world). Most importantly, the solu-
tion to the looting of Africa is to be found in the self-activity of progressive 
Africans themselves, in their campaigns and declarations, their struggles 
–sometimes victorious but still mainly frustrated– and their hunger for 
an Africa which can finally throw off the chains of an exploitative world 
economy and a power elite who treat the continent without respect.
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